The Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (spa-s) comprises three sets of agents, namely students, projects and lecturers, where students have preferences over projects and lecturers have preferences over students. In this scenario we seek a stable matching, that is, an assignment of students to projects such that there is no student and lecturer who have an incentive to deviate from their assignee/s. We study spa-st, the extension of spa-s in which the preference lists of students and lecturers need not be strictly ordered, and may contain ties. In this scenario, stable matchings may be of different sizes, and it is known that max spa-st, the problem of finding a maximum stable matching in spa-st, is NP-hard. We present a linear-time 3 2 -approximation algorithm for max spa-st and an Integer Programming (IP) model to solve max spa-st optimally. We compare the approximation algorithm with the IP model experimentally using randomly-generated data. We find that the performance of the approximation algorithm easily surpassed the 3 2 bound, constructing a stable matching within 92% of optimal in all cases, with the percentage being far higher for many instances.
Introduction
Background and motivation. In universities all over the world, students need to be assigned to projects as part of their degree programmes. Lecturers typically offer a range of projects, and students may rank a subset of the available projects in preference order. Lecturers may have preferences over students, or over the projects they offer, or they may not have explicit preferences at all. There may also be capacity constraints on the maximum numbers of students that can be allocated to each project and lecturer. The problem of allocating students to projects subject to these preference and capacity constraints is called the projects [2] , or over the projects they offer [10] , or not at all [7] . In this paper we focus on the first of these cases, where lecturers have preferences over students -the so-called
Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (spa-s).
Finding an optimal allocation of students to projects manually is time-consuming and errorprone. Consequently many universities automate the allocation process using a centralised algorithm. Given the typical sizes of problem instances (e.g., 130 students at the University of Glasgow, School of Computing Science), the efficiency of the matching algorithm is of paramount importance. In the case of spa-s, the desired matching must be stable with respect to the given preference lists, meaning that no student and lecturer have an incentive to deviate from the given allocation and form an assignment with one another [11] .
Abraham et al.
[2] described a linear-time algorithm to find a stable matching in an instance I of spa-s when all preference lists in I are strictly ordered. They also showed that, under this condition, all stable matchings in I are of the same size. In this paper we focus on the variant of spa-s in which preference lists of students and lecturers can contain ties, which we refer to as the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students including Ties (spa-st) . Ties allow both students and lecturers to express indifference in their preference lists (in practice, for example, lecturers may be unable to distinguish between certain groups of students). A stable matching in an instance of spa-st can be found in linear time by breaking the ties arbitrarily and using the algorithm of Abraham et al. [2] .
The Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (smti) is a special case of spa-st in which each project and lecturer has capacity 1, and each lecturer offers one project. Given an instance of smti, it is known that stable matchings can have different sizes [9] , and thus the same is true for spa-st. Yet in practical applications it is desirable to match as many students to projects as possible. This motivates max spa-st, the problem of finding a maximum (cardinality) stable matching in an instance of spa-st. This problem is NP-hard, since the corresponding optimisation problem restricted to smti, which we refer to as max smti, is NP-hard [9] . Király [6] described a 3 2 -approximation algorithm for max smti. He also showed how to extend this algorithm to the case of the Hospitals-Residents problem with Ties (hrt), where hrt is the special case of spa-st in which each lecturer l offers one project p, and the capacities of l and p are equal. Yanagisawa [12] showed that max smti is not approximable within a factor of 33 29 unless P=NP; the same bound applies to max spa-st.
Our contribution. In this paper we describe a linear-time 3 2 -approximation algorithm for max spa-st. This algorithm is a non-trivial extension of Király's approximation algorithm for hrt as mentioned above. We also describe an Integer Programming (IP) model to solve max spa-st optimally. Through a series of experiments on randomly-generated data, we then compare the sizes of stable matchings output by our approximation algorithm with the sizes of optimal solutions obtained from our IP model. Our main finding is that the performance of the approximation algorithm easily surpassed the 3 other students who tie with s i . In phase 3, s i is considered unassigned and carries out no more applications. A project p j is fully available if p j and l k are both undersubscribed, where lecturer l k offers p j . A student s i meta-prefers project p j1 to p j2 if either (i) rank(s i , p j1 ) < rank(s i , p j2 ), or (ii) rank(s i , p j1 ) = rank(s i , p j2 ) and p j1 is fully available, whereas p j2 is not. In phase 1 or 2, s i may be either available, provisionally assigned or confirmed. Student s i is available if they are not assigned to a project. Student s i is provisionally assigned if s i has been assigned in phase 1 and there is a project still on s i 's list that meta-prefers to p j . Otherwise, s i is confirmed.
If a student s i is a provisionally assigned to project p j , then (s i , p j ) is said to be precarious. A project p j is precarious if it is assigned a student s i such that (s i , p j ) is precarious. A lecturer is precarious if they offer a project p j that is precarious. Lecturer l k meta-prefers s i1 to s i2 if either (i) rank(l k , s i1 ) < rank(l k , s i2 ), or (ii) rank(l k , s i1 ) = rank(l k , s i2 ) and s i1 is in phase 2, whereas s i2 is not. The favourite projects F i of a student s i are defined as the set of projects on s i 's preference list for which there is no other project on s i 's list meta-preferred to any project in F i . A worst assignee of lecturer l k is defined to be a student in M (l k ) of worst rank, with priority given to phase 1 students over phase 2 students. Similarly, a worst assignee of lecturer l k in M (p j ) is defined to be a student in M (p j ) of worst rank, prioritising phase 1 over phase 2 students, where l k offers p j .
We remark that some of the above terms such as favourite and precarious have been defined for the spa-st setting by extending the definitions of the corresponding terms as given by Király in the hrt context [6] .
Description of the algorithm
Algorithm 1 begins with an empty matching M which will be built up over the course of the algorithm's execution. All students are initially set to be available and in phase 1. The algorithm proceeds as follows. While there are still available students in phase 1 or 2, choose some such student s i . Student s i applies to a favourite project p j at the head of their list, that is, there is no project on s i 's list that s i meta-prefers to p j . Let l k be the lecturer who offers p j . We consider the following cases.
If p j and l k are both undersubscribed then (s i , p j ) is added to M . Clearly if (s i , p j ) were not added to M , it would potentially be a blocking pair of type (3a). If p j is undersubscribed, l k is full and l k is precarious where precarious pair (s i , p j ) ∈ M for some project p j offered by l k , then we remove (s i , p j ) from M and add pair (s i , p j ). This notion of precariousness allows us to find a stable matching of sufficient size even when there are ties in student preference lists (there may also be ties in lecturer preference lists). Allowing a pair (s i , p j ) ∈ M to be precarious means that we are noting that s i has other fully available project options in their preference list at equal rank to p j . Hence, if another student applies to p j when p j is full, or to a project offered by l k where l k is full, we allow this assignment to happen removing (s i , p j ) from M , since there is a chance that the size of the resultant matching could be increased. If on the other hand p j is undersubscribed, l k is full and l k meta-prefers s i to a worst assignee s i , where (s i , p j ) ∈ M for some project p j offered by l k , then we remove (s i , p j ) from M and add pair (s i , p j ). It makes intuitive sense that if l k is full and gets an offer to an undersubscribed project from a student s i that they prefer to a worst assigned student s i , then l k would want to remove s i from p j and take on s i for p j . Student s i will subsequently remove p j from their preference list as l k will not want to assign to them on re-application. This is done via the Remove-pref method (Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 1 3/2-approximation algorithm for spa-st
Require: An instance I of spa-st Ensure: Return a stable matching M where |M | ≥ 2 3 |M opt | 1: M ← ∅ 2: all students are initially set to be available and in phase 1 3: while there exists an available student s i ∈ S who is in phase 1 or 2 do 4: let l k be the lecturer who offers p j
5:
s i applies to a favourite project p j ∈ A(s i )
6:
if p j is fully available then 7:
else if p j is undersubscribed, l k is full and (l k is precarious or l k meta-prefers s i to a worst assignee) then according to the worst assignee definition in Section 3.1
9:
if l k is precarious then 10: let p j be a project in P k such that there exists (s i , p j ) ∈ M that is precarious
11:
else l k is not precarious
12:
let s i be a worst assignee of l k such that l k meta-prefers s i to s i and let p j = M (s i )
13:
Remove-Pref(s i , p j ) If p j is full and precarious then pair (s i , p j ) is added to M while precarious pair (s i , p j ) is removed. As before, this allows s i to potentially assign to other fully available projects at the same rank as p j on their list. Since s i does not remove p j from their preference list, s i will get another chance to assign to p j if these other applications to fully available projects at the same rank are not successful.
If p j is full and l k meta-prefers s i to a worst assignee s i in M (p j ), then pair (s i , p j ) is added to M while (s i , p j ) is removed. As this lecturer's project is full (and not precarious) the only time they will want to add a student s i to this project (meaning the removal of another student) is if s i is preferred to a worst student s i assigned to that project. Let (s i , p j ) be a blocking pair of type (3bi)
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end while 6: return M Similar to before, s i will not subsequently be able to assign to this project and so removes it from their preference list via the Remove-pref method (Algorithm 2).
When removing a project from a student s i 's preference list (the Remove-pref operation of Algorithm 2), if s i has removed all projects from their preference list and is in phase 1 then their preference list is reinstated and they are set to be in phase 2. If on the other hand they were already in phase 2, then they are set to be in phase 3 and are hence inactive. The proof that Algorithm 1 produces a stable matching (see Appendix B) relies only on the fact that a student iterates once through their preference list. Allowing students to iterate through their preference lists a second time when in phase 2 allows us to find a stable matching of sufficient size when there are ties in lecturer preference lists (there may also be ties in student preference lists). This is due to the meta-prefers definition where a lecturer favours one student s i over another s i if they are the same rank and s i is in phase 2 whereas s i is not. Similar to above, this then allows s i to steal a position from s i with the chance that s i may find another assignment and increase the size of the resultant matching.
After the main while loop has terminated, the final part of the algorithm begins where all blocking pairs of type (3bi) are removed using the Promote-students method (Algorithm 3). . The proofs required for this algorithm are naturally longer and more complex than given by Király [6] for smti, as spa-st generalises smti to the case that lecturers can offer multiple projects, and projects and lecturers may have capacities greater than 1. These extensions add extra components to the definition of a blocking pair (given in Section 2) which in turn adds complexity to the algorithm and its proof of correctness.
Proof of correctness
Appendix B.5 shows a simple example instance where a matching found by Algorithm 1 is exactly 2 3 times the optimal size, hence the analysis of the performance guarantee is tight.
IP model
In this section we present an IP model for max spa-st. For the stability constraints in the model, it is advantageous to use an equivalent condition for stability, as given by the following lemma, whose proof can be found in Appendix C. The key variables in the model are binary-valued variables x ij , defined for each s i ∈ S and p j ∈ P , where x ij = 1 if and only if student s i is assigned to project p j . Additionally, we have binary-valued variables α ij and β ij for each s i ∈ S and p j ∈ P . These variables allow us to more easily describe the stability constraints below. For each s i ∈ S and l k ∈ L, let
That is, T ik is the set of students ranked at least as highly as student s i in lecturer l k 's preference list not including s i . Also, for each p j ∈ P , let
That is, T ijk is the set of students s u ranked at least as highly as student s i in lecturer l k 's preference list, such that project p j is acceptable to s u , not including s i . Finally, let S ij = {p r ∈ P : rank(s i , p r ) ≤ rank(s i , p j )}, that is, S ij is the set of projects ranked at least as highly as project p j in student s i 's preference list, including p j . Figure 1 shows the IP model for max spa-st. Equation (1) enforces x ij = 0 if s i finds p j unacceptable. Inequality (2) ensures that a student may be assigned to a maximum of one project. Inequalities (3) and (4) ensure that project and lecturer capacities are enforced. In the left hand side of Inequality (5), if 1 − pr∈Sij x ir = 1, then either s i is unmatched or s i prefers p j to M (s i ). This also ensures that either α ij = 1 or β ij = 1, described in Inequalities (6) and (7). Inequality (6) ensures that, if α ij = 1, the number of students ranked at least as highly as student s i by l k (not including s i ) and assigned to l k must be at least l k 's capacity d k . Inequality (7) ensures that, if β ij = 1, the number of students ranked at least as highly as student s i in lecturer l k 's preference list (not including s i ) and assigned to p j must be at least p j 's capacity c j . x ij subject to: 1.
S E
su∈T ijk
Finally, for our optimisation we maximise the sum of all x ij variables in order to maximise the number of students assigned. The following result, proved in Appendix C, establishes the correctness of the IP model.
Theorem 3.
Given an instance I of spa-st, let J be the IP model as defined in Figure 1 . A maximum stable matching in I corresponds to an optimal solution in J and vice versa.
5
Experimental evaluation
Methodology
Experiments were conducted on the approximation algorithm and the IP model using randomly-generated data in order to measure the effects on matching statistics when changing parameter values relating to (1) instance size, (2) probability of ties in preference lists, and (3) preference list lengths. Two further experiments (referred to as (4) and (5) below) explored scalability properties for both techniques. Instances were generated using both existing and new software. The existing software is known as the Matching Algorithm Toolkit and is a collaborative project developed by students and staff at the University of Glasgow. For a given spa-st instance, let the total project and lecturer capacities be denoted by c P and d L , respectively. Note that these capacities were distributed randomly, subject to there being a maximum difference of 1 between the capacities of any two projects or any two lecturers (to ensure uniformity). The minimum and maximum size of student preference lists is given by l min and l max , and t s represents the probability that a project on a student's preference list is tied with the next project. Lecturer preference lists were generated initially from the student preference lists, where a lecturer l k must rank a student if a student ranks a project offered by l k . These lists were randomly shuffled and t l denotes the ties probability for lecturer preference lists. A linear distribution was used to make some projects more popular than others and in all experiments the most popular project is around 5 times more popular than the least. This distribution influenced the likelihood of a student finding a given project acceptable. Parameter details for each experiment are given below.
(1) Increasing instance size: 10 sets of 10, 000 instances were created (labelled SIZE1, ..., SIZE10). The number of students n 1 increased from 100 to 1000 in steps of 100, with n 2 = 0.6n 1 , n 3 = 0.4n 1 , c P = 1.4n 1 , d L = 1.2n 1 . The probabilities of ties in preference lists were t s = t l = 0.2 throughout all instance sets. Lengths of preference lists l min = 3 and l max = 5 also remained the same and were kept low to ensure a wide variability in stable matching size per instance. (2) Increasing probability of ties: 11 sets of 10, 000 instances were created (labelled TIES1, ..., TIES11). Throughout all instance sets n 1 = 300, n 2 = 250, n 3 = 120, c P = 420, d L = 360, l min = 3 and l max = 5. The probabilities of ties in student and lecturer preference lists increased from t s = t l = 0.0 to t s = t l = 0.5 in steps of 0.05. (3) Increasing preference list lengths: 10 sets of 10, 000 instances were generated (labelled PREF1, ..., PREF10). Similar to the TIES cases, throughout all instance sets n 1 = 300, n 2 = 250, n 3 = 120, c P = 420 and d L = 360. Additionally, t s = t l = 0.2. Preference list lengths increased from l min = l max = 1 to l min = l max = 10 in steps of 1. (4) Instance size scalability: 5 sets of 10 instances were generated (labelled SCALS1, ..., SCALS5). All instance sets in this experiment used the same parameter values as the SIZE experiment, except the number of students n 1 increased from 10, 000 to 50, 000 in steps of 10, 000. (5) Preference list scalability: Finally, 6 sets of 10 instances were created (labelled SCALP1, ..., SCALP6). Throughout all instance sets n 1 = 500 with the same values for other parameters as the SIZE experiment. However in this case ties were fixed at t s = t l = 0.4, and l min = l max increasing from 25 to 150 in steps of 25.
For each generated instance, we ran the 3 2 -approximation algorithm and then used the IP model to find a maximum stable matching. We also computed a minimum stable matching using a simple adaptation of our IP model for max spa-st, in order to measure the spread in the sizes of stable matchings. A timeout of 1800 seconds (30 minutes) was imposed on all instance runs. All experiments were conducted using a machine with 32 cores, 8×64GB RAM and Dual Intel ® Xeon ® CPU E5-2697A v4 processors. The operating system was Ubuntu version 17.04 with all code compiled in Java version 1.8, where the IP models were solved using Gurobi version 7.5.2. Each approximation algorithm instance was run on a single thread while each IP instance was run on two threads. No attempt was made to parallelise Java garbage collection. Repositories for the code and data can be found at https://doi.org/ 10.5281/zenodo.1183221 and https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1186823 respectively.
Correctness testing was conducted over all generated instances. This consisted of (1) ensuring that each matching produced by the approximation algorithm was at least 2 3 the size of maximum stable matching, as found by the IP, and, (2) testing that a given allocation was stable and adhered to all project and lecturer capacities. This was run over all output from both the approximation algorithm and the IP-based algorithm.
Experimental results
Experimental results can be seen in Tables 1, 2 ties and preference list lengths were increased, respectively). From this point onwards an optimal matching refers to a maximum stable matching. In these tables, column 'minimum A/Max' gives the minimum ratio of approximation algorithm matching size to optimal matching size that occurred, '% A=Max' displays the percentage of times the approximation algorithm achieved an optimal result, and '% A≥ 0.98Max' shows the percentage of times the approximation algorithm achieved a result at least 98% of optimal. The 'average size' columns are somewhat self explanatory, with sub-columns 'A/Max' and 'Min/Max' showing the average approximation algorithm matching size and minimum stable matching size as a fraction of optimal. Finally, 'average total time' indicates the time taken for model creation, solving and outputting results per instance. The main findings are summarised below. Tables 1, 2 and 3, we see that the smallest value was within the SIZE1 instance set with a ratio of 0.9286. This is well above the required bound of On average the approximation algorithm provides results that are closer in size to the average maximum stable matching than the minimum stable matching. The columns 'A/Max' and 'Min/Max' show that, on average, for each instance set, the approximation algorithm produces a solution that is within 98% of maximum and far closer to the maximum size than to the minimum size. Table 4 shows the scalability results for increasing instance sizes (Experiment 4) and increasing preference list lengths (Experiment 5). The 'instances completed' column indicates the number of instances completed before timeout occurred. In addition to showing the average total time taken (where 'total' includes model creation time and solution time), the column 'average solve time' displays the time taken to either execute the approximation algorithm, or solve the IP model (in both cases, model creation time is excluded).
The approximation algorithm consistently far exceeds its
For Experiment 4, the number of instances solved within the 30-minute timeout reduced from 10 to 0 for the IP-based algorithm finding the maximum stable matching. However, even for the largest instance set sizes the approximation algorithm was able to solve all instances on average within a total of 21 seconds (0.8 seconds of which was used to actually execute the algorithm).
For Experiment 5, with a higher probability of ties and increasing preference list lengths, the IP-based algorithm was only able to solve all the instances of one instance set (SCALP2) within 30 minutes each, however the approximation algorithm took less than 0.3 seconds on average to return a solution for each instance. This shows that the approximation algorithm is useful for either larger or more complex instances than the IP-based algorithm can handle, motivating its use for real world scenarios.
6
Future work
This paper has described a 3 2 -approximation algorithm for max spa-st. It remains open to describe an approximation algorithm that has a better performance guarantee, and/or to prove a stronger lower bound on the inapproximability of the problem than the current best bound of 33 29 [12] . Further experiments could also measure the extent to which the order that students apply to projects in Algorithm 1 affects the size of the stable matching generated.
The work in this paper has mainly focused on the size of stable matchings. However, it is possible for a stable matching to admit a blocking coalition, where a permutation of student assignments could improve the allocations of the students and lecturers involved without harming anyone else. Since permutations of this kind cannot change the size of the matching they are not studied further here, but would be of interest for future work. 
A Cloning from SPA-ST to HRT
Manlove [8, Theorem 3.11] describes a polynomial transformation from a weakly stable matching in and instance of hrt to a weakly stable matching in an instance of smti, and vice versa, where the size of matchings is conserved. A natural cloning method to convert instances of SPA-ST to instances of HRT is given as Algorithm 4. This algorithm involves converting students into residents and projects into hospitals. Hospitals inherit their capacity from projects. Residents inherit their preference lists naturally from students. Hospitals inherit their preference lists from the lecturer who offers their associated project; a resident entry r i is ranked only if r i also ranks this hospital. In order to translate lecturer capacities into the HRT instance, a number of dummy residents are created for each lecturer. The number created for lecturer l k is equal to the sum of capacities of their offered projects P k minus the capacity of l k . We will ensure that all dummy residents are assigned in any stable matching. To this end, each dummy resident has a first position tie of all hospitals associated with projects of l k , and each hospital h j in this set has a first position tie of all dummy residents associated with l k . In this way, as all dummy S E A 2 0 1 8 8:14 A 3 2 -approximation algorithm for the Student-Project Allocation problem residents must be assigned in any stable matching by Proposition 4 lecturer capacities are automatically adhered to.
Proposition 4. Let I be an instance of hrt created from an instance I of spa-st using Algorithm 4. All dummy residents must be assigned in any stable matching in I .
Proof. In I , for each lecturer l k , the number of dummy residents created is equal to h j inherits their preference list from l k 's list, where a resident entry r i is retained only if r i also ranks h j 10: end for 11: for all lecturer l k in L do 12:
let H k denote the set of all hospitals in I associated with the projects of P k in I 
Here, n 1 denotes the number of students, n 2 the number of projects, D the total capacities of lecturers and m the total length of student preference lists.
Proof. Suppose M is a stable matching in I. We construct an instance I of hrt using Algorithm 4. The time complexity of O(n 1 + Dn 2 + m) for the reduction carried out by the algorithm is achieved by noting that I has a maximum of n 1 + n 2 + D agents and that there are a maximum of Dn 2 + m acceptable resident-hospital pairs.
Initially let M = M . Let the set of dummy residents R d in I form a resident-complete matching (when considering the residents in R d ) with the set of all hospitals and add these pairs to M . This is possible (as proved in Proposition 4) because for each lecturer l k each dummy resident associated with l k denoted R k d finds all projects in P k acceptable, and moreover the total number of remaining positions of the projects is at least as large as
All dummy residents must be assigned in M to their first-choice hospital by above, hence r i corresponds to a student s i in I. Resident r i inherited their preference list from s i hence we know that s i finds p j acceptable. Therefore by the definition given in Section 2, condition (1) of a blocking pair of M in I is satisfied. Resident r i is either unassigned in M or prefers h j to M (r i ). Student s i is therefore in an equivalent position and condition (2) of a blocking pair of M in I is satisfied. Hospital h j is either undersubscribed or prefers r i to their worst assignee in M .
If h j is undersubscribed, then p j must also be undersubscribed. Therefore by the definition in Section 2, (s i , p j ) is a blocking pair of M in I, a contradiction. Since dummy residents are added in the algorithm's execution it is clear that in general |M | = |M |. However, since all dummy residents must be assigned by Proposition 4, it is trivial to calculate the difference
The converse of Theorem 5 is not true in general, as shown in the example in Figure 2 . Here a stable matching M in an instance I of hrt does not convert into a stable matching M of the associated instance I of spa-st.
A natural question arises as to whether in special circumstances we can use the cloning process described in Algorithm 4: that is, convert to hrt then to smti, then use Király's 3/2-approximation algorithm on the smti instance, and obtain as a result a matching that is a 3/2-approximation to a maximum stable matching in the original instance of spa-st. For example, assuming that the matching M resulting from the above process is stable, can we ensure the 3/2 bound?
The following example demonstrates Algorithm 4 in use and shows that the process described above is not sufficient to retain the 3/2-approximation in an spa-st instance even if M is stable. Project details:
Lecturer preferences: Algorithm 4 is used to convert the spa-st instance I in Figure 3a to an instance I of HRT in Figure 3b which is then itself converted to the instance I of SMTI in Figure 3c using the process described by Manlove [8, Theorem 3.11] . In this process men correspond to hospitals in I (projects in I) and women correspond to residents in I (students in I). Executing Király's [6] 3/2-approximation algorithm on the smti instance I could (depending on order of proposals) yield the matching M = {(w 2 , m 4 ), (w 4 , m 3 ), (w 5 , m 2 ), (w 6 , m 6 ), (w 7 , m 7 )} in I . A trace of how this matching is created is given in Table 5 . As w 5 , w 6 and w 7 were created from dummy residents in Algorithm 4, M (stable in I ) converts into the matching M c = {(s 2 , p 4 ), (s 4 , p 3 )} of size 2 in I. But a maximum stable matching in I is of size 4, given by M = {(s 1 , p 3 ), (s 2 , p 1 ), (s 3 , p 3 ), (s 4 , p 2 )}. Therefore using the cloning method described above and Király's algorithm does not result in a 3/2-approximation to the maximum stable matching for instances of spa-st. This motivates the development of a 3/2-approximation algorithm to the maximum stable matching specifically for instances of spa-st.
An intuitive idea as to how the addition of dummy residents in the conversion of this spa-st instance to an smti instance stops the retention of the 3/2 bound follows. Figure 4a shows the spa-st instance I 2 which is the same as the instance in Figure 3a but with project 1 and 2 capacities reduced to 1. Figure 4c shows I 2 converted into an smti instance I 2 using the same two-stage process as in Figure 3 . Finally, Table 6 shows the algorithm trace for instance I 2 using Király's 3/2 smti algorithm.
The main first difference in the traces can be seen on line 14 of Table 5 and line 11 of  Table 6 . On line 11 of Table 6 , m 2 applies to w 4 as an advantaged man, giving them the ability to take w 4 from m 3 . This shows the benefit of having a tie including m 2 and m 3 at the beginning of w 4 's list -either of these men being matched to w 4 would be equally useful in a stable matching. Therefore allowing m 2 to take w 4 from m 3 gives m 3 a chance to get another partner, increasing the size of matching eventually attained. On line 14 of 
Lecturer preferences:
Resident preferences:
Hospital preferences: h 1 : (r 5 r 6 ) r 2 r 4 h 2 : (r 5 r 6 ) r 2 r 4 h 3 : r 7 r 4 (r 1 r 3 ) h 4 : r 7 r 4 r 2 e 1 = 2 e 2 = 2 e 3 = 2 e 4 = 1 (b) hrt instance I converted from the spa-st instance in Figure 3a .
Women's preferences:
Men's preferences: m 1 : (w 5 w 6 ) w 2 w 4 m 2 : (w 5 w 6 ) w 2 w 4 m 3 : w 7 w 4 (w 1 w 3 ) m 4 : w 7 w 4 w 2 m 5 : (w 5 w 6 ) w 2 w 4 m 6 : (w 5 w 6 ) w 2 w 4 m 7 : w 7 w 4 (w 1 w 3 ) (c) smti instance I converted from the hrt instance in Figure 3b . being able to ever apply to w 4 as an advantaged man and the benefits of having m 2 and m 3 tied at the beginning of w 4 's preference list are not realised. Proof. Assume for contradiction that project p j is not fully available at some point before T 0 , but then subsequently becomes fully available before T 0 . At a point where p j is not fully available, either p j is full or l k is full (or both), where l k offers p j . If l k is full, it is clear that l k must remain so, since students can only be removed from a project of l k 's if they are immediately replaced by another student assigning to a project of l k . Therefore assume that p j is full. Then they must somehow become undersubscribed in order to be classified as fully available. The only way this can happen before T 0 is if lecturer l k removes a student assigned to p j in order to replace them with a student becoming assigned to another project of l k 's. But then this deletion can only occur if l k is full and as above l k remains full, so p j cannot become fully available before T 0 , a contradiction. Table 6 Trace of running Király's smti 3/2-approximation algorithm to the maximum stable matching for instance I 2 in Figure 3c . Proof. Assume for contradiction that l k is undersubscribed at T 0 . We know that once a lecturer is full they must remain full (since we can only remove a pair associated with a lecturer if we are immediately replacing it with an associated pair). Therefore l k must have always been undersubscribed. At T 0 , p j must be undersubscribed for (s i , p j ) to be a blocking pair of type (3bi). Therefore at T 0 , p j is fully available and must always have previously been fully available by Proposition 6. But s i must have applied to p j at least once before T 0 and as p j was fully available this must have been accepted. Then since (s i , p j ) is not in the matching at T 0 it must have been removed before T 0 . But in order for this to happen either p j or l k would have to be full, contradicting the fact that p j was fully available before T 0 . Hence l k must be full at T 0 .
S E
The following proposition extends Proposition 6. Proof. Let T 0 denote the point in the algorithm's execution at the end of the main while loop. We know from Proposition 6 that if a project is not fully available before T 0 then it cannot subsequently become fully available before T 0 .
Let lecturer l k offer project p j and assume project p j is not fully available at T 0 . If l k contains no blocking pairs of type (3bi) then there can be no changes to allocations of p j after T 0 . Therefore assume l k contains at least one blocking pair. Then by Proposition 7, l k is full at T 0 . But Algorithm 3 does not change the student allocations for any lecturer and hence l k remains full and p j cannot subsequently become fully available.
It remains to show that if p j is fully available at T 0 , that it cannot subsequently cease to be fully available and then return to be fully available before the end of the algorithms execution. Since l k is undersubscribed at T 0 , l k cannot contain any blocking pairs by Proposition 7. Since Algorithm 3 can only affect allocations of projects offered by a full lecturer it is not possible for p j to change to being not fully available after T 0 .
Proposition 9.
No student promotion carried out in Algorithm 3 can be to a fully available project or create a precarious pair.
Proof. Suppose in Algorithm 3, s i is being promoted from project p j to project p j both offered by lecturer l k . We know that in the main while loop s i must have iterated over their preference list at least to the position of p j (and perhaps further if s i has been previously promoted). Therefore, s i has either been removed from and / or rejected by all projects at the same rank as p j in their preference list at least once. This can only occur if each of those projects was not fully available at the time and by Proposition 8 none of these projects could subsequently be fully available. Therefore when s i is promoted to p j , it can never form a precarious pair. Proof. We know that a precarious pair cannot be created in Algorithm 3 by Proposition 9, therefore we focus on the main while loop of Algorithm 1. Let lecturer l k be full and not precarious at some point during the main while loop Algorithm 1's execution and assume that they later becomes precarious. Since l k is currently not precarious, the only way they can become so is by a student s i forming a precarious assignment to a project of l k 's. But recall that a student will first apply to fully available projects at the head of their preference list. Since l k is full, no project of l k 's can be considered fully available. In order for s i to apply to a project of l k 's they must first apply to all fully available projects at the head of their list, gain the assignment and then be removed from M . But if a pair (s i , p j ) is removed from M , p j cannot be fully available. Ultimately, s i will have exhausted all previously fully available projects at the head of their list before eventually applying to a project of l k 's. But then at that point s i cannot be precarious giving a contradiction. Now, let p j be full and not precarious at some point during the main while loop of Algorithm 1's execution and assume that it later becomes precarious. If p j remains full until the time at which it becomes precarious then using similar reasoning to above, any student assigning to p j cannot be precarious giving a contradiction. If p j becomes undersubscribed at any point then l k must be full for the remainder of the algorithm by Proposition 8. It is possible at this point that l k is precarious (with precarious pairs that include projects other than p j ) but since l k is full, p j is not fully available. Therefore using similar reasoning to before, any student assigning to p j cannot be precarious giving a contradiction.
It also follows then that if l k is full and p j is not precarious then p j cannot subsequently become precarious. Proof. Let M 0 be the matching being built at T 0 and let (s i , p j ) ∈ M 0 with l k offering p j . Suppose for contradiction that l k is precarious at T 0 .
As (s i , p j ) is a blocking pair of type (3bi), p j must be undersubscribed at T 0 . Also, since (s i , p j ) is a blocking pair we know that s i prefers p j to p j . Therefore s i must have removed p j from their preference list. Denote this time as T 1 . The removal at T 1 occurred either because (s i , p j ) was removed as a non-precarious pair, or because s i was rejected on application to p j .
If (s i , p j ) was removed as a non-precarious pair at T 1 then either l k was full, nonprecarious and s i was a worst student assigned to l k , or p j was full, non-precarious and s i was a worst student assigned to p j . If on the other hand, s i was rejected on application to p j at T 1 , we know that either l k was full, non-precarious and l k did not meta-prefer s i to a worst student in M (l k ), or p j was full, non-precarious and l k did not meta-prefer s i to a worst student in M (p j ).
Whichever of these possibilities occurred we know that at T 1 , either l k was full and non-precarious or p j was full and non-precarious.
Firstly suppose l k was full and non-precarious at T 1 . In this case by Proposition 10 l k cannot subsequently become precarious, a contradiction to the fact that l k is precarious at T 0 . Therefore, p j must have full and non-precarious at T 1 . By Proposition 10, p j cannot subsequently become precarious. We also know that p j must go from being full to being undersubscribed since p j is undersubscribed at T 0 . Denote this point in the algorithm's execution as T 2 . At T 2 , p j must be non-precarious by above and so a non-precarious pair involved with p j is removed and replaced with a pair involved with some other project of l k 's. This could only happen if l k was full and non-precarious and so as before cannot again become precarious, a contradiction. Proof. By Proposition 9, in Algorithm 3 it is not possible to assign a student to a fully available project. Therefore we cannot change a fully available project or lecturer to being not fully available. Also, any promotions that take place will be to remove a blocking pair of type (3bi), and so by definition the lecturer involved, say l k , will be full and |M (l k )| will remain the same. Therefore, none of l k 's projects are not fully available at the start of Algorithm 3 and must remain so.
By Proposition 9, in Algorithm 3 it is not possible to create a precarious pair, meaning we cannot change a non-precarious project or lecturer to being a precarious project or lecturer. Finally, by Proposition 11 no changes can be made to any assignments involving a precarious project or lecturer, hence we cannot change a precarious project or lecturer to be non-precarious. Also, since Algorithm 3 cannot change the fully available status of any project, it is not possible for a pair to change it's precarious status.
Recall, a worse student than student s i , according to lecturer l k , is any student with a lower rank than s i on l k 's preference list, or if s i is in phase 2, any student of the same rank that is in phase 1. Proof. We deal with each case separately. 1. Assume first that p j is full and not precarious. Before T 0 , student s i can only be added to the matching if the conditions on Line 17 are held, and l k meta-prefers s i to a worst assignee in M (p j ). Therefore l k cannot accept a student that is worse than or equal to a worst student in M (p j ) before T 0 . 2. It is clear that in Algorithm 3 students assigned to a particular lecturer cannot change, hence we concentrate only on the main while loop of Algorithm 1. Now assume that l k is full and not precarious before T 0 . Also since the case where p j is full has been dealt with, assume that p j is undersubscribed. Since l k is not precarious, if s i were to be added to the matching, l k must adhere to the conditions on Line 8 and so meta-prefer s i to a worst assignee of l k . Therefore l k cannot accept a student that is worse than or equal to a worst student in M (l k ). Therefore each case is proved.
Proposition 13. Let T 0 denote the point in Algorithm 1's execution at the end of the main
If on the other hand, as an example, l k is full and precarious (or p j is full and precarious) before T 0 it is easy to see that a student worse than the current lowest ranked assignee in M (l k ) (M (p j )) could be added before T 0 . If p b2 was undersubscribed and l b3 was full at T 0 then l b3 cannot have been precarious (since s b1 is about to remove p b2 from their list) and by Proposition 10, cannot subsequently become precarious. By Proposition 13, l b3 cannot subsequently accept a student ranked lower than a worst student in M 0 (l b3 ). Also either s b1 is a worst assignee in M 0 (l b3 ) (Line 13), or l b3 ranks s b1 at least as badly as a worst student in M 0 (l b3 ) (Line 27). Lecturer l b3 must remain full for the rest of the algorithm since if a student is removed from a project offered by l b3 then they are immediately replaced. Therefore l b3 must be full in M 1 , and since l b3 cannot have accepted a worse ranked student than s b1 after T 0 , (s b1 , p b2 ) cannot be a blocking pair of M 1 of type (3bii) or (3c). Instead assume at T 0 that p b2 is full in M 0 . As s b1 is about to remove p b2 , we know p b2 cannot be precarious, and by Proposition 10, cannot subsequently become precarious. Either s b1 is a worst assignee in M 0 (p b2 ) (Line 22), or l b3 ranks s b1 at least as badly as a worst student in M 0 (p b2 ) (Line 27). If p b2 remains full until T 1 , then clearly (s b1 , p b2 ) cannot block M 1 by Proposition 13. So assume p b2 becomes undersubscribed at some point between T 0 and T 1 for the first time, say at T 0.5 . This can only happen if l b3 is full and there is a student s i who assigns to another project p j that l b3 offers, where s i is meta-preferred to a worst student in M 0 (l b3 ). This worst student must also be a worst student in M 0 (p b2 ) since we are removing from M 0 a pair associated with p b2 . But then s b1 must be ranked at least as badly as a worst student in M 0 (l b3 ). Using similar reasoning to the previous case, l b3 must be full in M 1 , non-precarious, and since l b3 cannot have accepted a worse ranked student than s b1 after T 0.5 , (s b1 , p b2 ) cannot be a blocking pair of M 1 of type (3bii) or (3c).
B.2 Stability
Hence it is not possible for (s b1 , p b2 ) to be a blocking pair of M of type (3a), (3bii) or (3c) after the main while loop. During the main while loop's execution, student s i must have removed p j from their preference list in order to eventually assign to p j . Student s i 's removal of p j could only happen if p j was not precarious at this point. By Proposition 10, p j cannot subsequently become precarious. Let the matching constructed immediately before this removal be denoted by M 0 and let T 0 denote this point in the algorithm's execution. Project p j was either full or undersubscribed at T 0 . We show that in both of these cases, s i is one of the worst students in M 1 (l k ).
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Suppose p j was full at T 0 . Then as p j is not precarious, p j cannot subsequently be assigned a student worse than the worst assignee in M 0 (p j ) up until T 1 , by Proposition 13. Since s i removed p j from their list while p j was full we know that either s i is a worst assignee in M 0 (p j ) (Line 22), or l k ranks s i at least as badly as a worst student in M 0 (p j ) (Line 27). Between T 0 and T 1 , s i assigns to the project p j , at a worse rank than p j in s i 's list, where p j is also offered by l k . Now, we know that p j becomes undersubscribed by T 1 and so it must be the case that there is a point T 0.5 between T 0 and T 1 , such that another student s i assigns to a project (not p j ) of l k 's which removes pair (s i , p j ) from the matching constructed just before that removal, denoted by M 0.5 . Let T 0.5 be the first point at which p j becomes undersubscribed after T 0 . Lecturer l k must be full at this point since the addition of s i removes a student (namely s i ) from a different project (namely p j ). Also, lecturer l k cannot have been precarious, otherwise p j would have been identified as a precarious project at Line 10, but we know p j cannot have been precarious after T 0 . So s i must have been a worst assignee in M 0.5 (l k ) and therefore M 0.5 (p j ). Since T 0.5 is the first point p j becomes undersubscribed after T 0 , the worst student in M 0.5 (p j ) can be no worse than the worst student in M 0 (p j ) by Proposition 13. Student s i must be either a worst student in M 0.5 (l k ), or be as bad as a worst student in M 0.5 (l k ). By Propositions 10 and 13, l k cannot be assigned a worse student than s i between T 0.5 to T 1 , and so as s i is assigned to l k at T 1 then they must be one of the worst students in M 1 (l k ). Suppose then that p j is undersubscribed at T 0 . Since a preference element is being removed, l k must have been full, non-precarious and either s i is a worst assignee in M 0 (l k ) (Line 13), or l k ranks s i at least as badly as a worst student in M 0 (l k ) (Line 27). But then by Propositions 10 and 13, l k must have remained non-precarious until T 1 and been unable to assign to a worse student than s i . Since s i is assigned to a project of l k 's, s i must be one of the worst students in M 1 (l k ).
Therefore, for any blocking pair (s i , p j ) of type (3bi) of M 1 , s i must be one of the worst students in M 1 (l k ). Proof. Let M 0 denote the matching at the end of the main while loop of Algorithm 1, and let T 0 denote this point in the algorithm's execution. Assume that during Algorithm 3's execution, the first promotion to reveal a blocking pair (s i , p j ) of type (3bi) occurs such that s i is not a worst student in M 1 (l k ). Let M 1 be the matching constructed just before this promotion occurs. Suppose the promotion involves student s i moving from a less preferred p j to a more preferred project p j . It is clear that in the removal of blocking pairs of type (3bi) there is no change in regards to which students are assigned to projects of l k , therefore the same students are assigned to each lecturer in M 0 , M 1 and M 2 . By Proposition 15, s i is and remains one of the worst assignees of l k in M 0 , M 1 and M 2 . Since s i is not a worst assignee in M 2 (l k ), l k must prefer s i to s i . But this would mean (s i , p j ) was a blocking pair of type (3c) in M 0 if p j were full or (3bii) in M 0 if p j were undersubscribed, both a contradiction to Lemma 14.
Proposition 17. It is not possible in Algorithm 3's execution, for a blocking pair of any type other than (3bi) to be created.
Proof. Let M 0 denote the matching constructed immediately after the main while loop of Algorithm 1 terminates and let T 0 denote this point in the algorithm's execution. By Lemma 14, only blocking pairs of type (3bi) of M 0 may exist at T 0 therefore we restrict our attention to the removal of such pairs. Assume for a contradiction that during Algorithm 3's execution, the first promotion to reveal a blocking pair of type not equal to (3bi) occurs. Let M 1 (respectively M 2 ) be the matching constructed just before (respectively after) this promotion occurs with T 1 (respectively T 2 ) denoting this point in the algorithm's execution. Suppose that this promotion involves student s i being promoted from project p j to project p j as pair (s i , p j ) is a blocking pair of M 1 of type (3bi). Since (s i , p j ) is a blocking pair of M 1 of type (3bi) we know that p j and p j are both offered by the same lecturer, say l k . Assume that this promotion has now revealed a blocking pair (s i , p j ) of type (3a), (3bii) or (3c) in M 2 . We look at each case in turn.
(3a) -Since in M 1 , (s i , p j ) was a blocking pair of type (3bi) we know that l k is full at T 1 . The promotion involves moving s i from one project offered by l k to another, therefore at T 2 , l k must be full and so p j cannot be involved in a blocking pair of type (3a) in M 2 , a contradiction. (3bii) -Suppose (s i , p j ) is a blocking pair of type (3bii) in M 2 . Since it is of type (3bii), l k must prefer s i to a worst assignee in M 2 (l k ) (and consequently M 1 (l k ) as students do not change lecturer). If p j was undersubscribed at T 1 then (s i , p j ) would have constituted a blocking pair of type (3bii), a contradiction. Therefore p j must have been full in M 1 . We know that (s i , p j ) ∈ M 1 and that s i is a worst assignee in M 1 (l k ) by Proposition 15 and 16, therefore l k prefers s i to s i . It follows that (s i , p j ) would have constituted a blocking pair in M 1 of type (3c), a contradiction to the fact that no blocking pair of any type other than (3bi) was revealed prior to T 2 . (3c) -Suppose finally that (s i , p j ) is a blocking pair of M 2 of type (3c). But blocking pairs of type (3c) require p j to be full in M 2 which it cannot be since (s i , p j ) has been removed just before T 2 , hence p j cannot be involved in a blocking pair of type (3c). Therefore it is not possible for a blocking pair of type (3a), (3bii) or (3c) to be created during the first promotion of a student, and hence any promotion. Algorithm 3 systematically removes blocking pairs of type (3bi) in a series of student promotions. Each promotion improves the outcome for a student.
Therefore there are no blocking pairs of any type in the finalised matching M s and so M s is stable.
Since this proof relies only on the fact that p b2 is removed from s b1 's list once for (s b1 , p b2 ) not to become a blocking pair, we can infer that if we allowed students to only iterate once through their preference preference list rather than twice, this would still result in a stable matching. Assume therefore that (s i , p j ) was precarious when removed from M . Then s i does not remove p j from their list and s i can again apply to p j during phase 1. Note that if (s i , p j ) is re-added to M it must be as a non-precarious pair. This is because, using similar reasoning that was used in Proposition 10, at the point at which s i reapplies to p j they must have exhausted all fully available projects at the head of their list, therefore (s i , p j ) cannot again become precarious. Therefore, s i can apply to p j a maximum of three times during the execution of the while loop: at most twice while s i is in phase 1 (twice only if (s i , p j ) is removed as a precarious pair) and at most once in phase 2.
B.3 Time complexity and termination

Lemma 20. All operations inside the main while loop of Algorithm 1 run in constant time.
Proof. The data structures required are described below and are summarised in Figure 5 . For initialisation purposes, each student, project and lecturer has a list of length n 2 , n 1 and n 1 respectively, each entry of which requires O(1) space. In order to not exceed a time complexity of order the sum of lengths of preference lists, a process of virtual initialisation is used on these data structures [3, p. 149] .
Student data structures. For each student a doubly-linked list of (project, rank) tuples embedded in an array, prefList, stores their preference list in order of rank, representing the undeleted entries. A small example is shown in Figure 5 with p 3 , p 2 and p 1 all of rank 1 on s i 's preference list. Entries may be deleted from this array; a copy of this list prior to any deletions being carried out is retained in order to allow a second iteration through a student's preference list, if they move into phase 2. An array projPosition of length n 2 retains links to the position of (project, rank) tuples in prefList, allowing a constant time removal of projects from prefList. An integer variable associated with each student stores which phase this student is in. Examples for these final two data structures are also shown in Figure 5 .
Project data structures. Each project has a link to their supervising lecturer. An array, projectedPrefList stores the projected preference list of l k for p j in the form of (student, rank, boolean) tuples. As an example, suppose p j has a projected preference list starting with s 7 at rank 1, s 4 at rank 1 and s 6 at rank 2 as is shown in Figure 5 . The boolean values indicate which student-project pairs are currently in the matching.
Once a project is full and non-precarious it cannot accept a worse student than it already has for the remainder of the algorithm, according to Proposition 10. Assume p j is full and nonprecarious. Let the worst student assigned to p j be given by s w . We retain a pointer, last, which points to the rightmost student at the same rank as s w in p j 's projectedPrefList. This pointer must move from right to left in a linear fashion (moving up in ranks) given the above proposition.
During the course of the algorithm, we may need to remove the worst student according to l k from M (p j ). It is possible that there are two or more students who are worst assignees with some being in phase 1 and some in phase 2. In order to ensure that we prioritise the removal of phase 1 students, two pointers are added for each entry in projectedPrefList, which point to the head of a phase 1 and a phase 2 doubly-linked list associated with that tie embedded in the projectedPrefList array (this data structure is not shown in Figure  5 ). Adding or removing a phase 1 or 2 student to either list takes constant time, as they do not need to be kept in order. Then, un-assigning a student requires a check to be made in the tie associated with the worst position (found using last), in order to prioritise a phase 1 student's removal. In total this takes constant time. Note that a student can only change phase if they are not allocated and therefore updating an allocated student's phase in these lists is not necessary unless they have just been added.
Each project also contains a doubly-linked list embedded in an array of students, denoted by precariousList, containing students who have formed a precarious pair with this project. In the example in Figure 5 , p j is not precarious and so no students form a precarious pair with p j . Adding to and removing from this list takes constant time if we assume that s i is stored at index i − 1. A project p j supports a student s i in being precarious if (s i , p j ) ∈ M and p j is the first fully available project at the same rank as p j in s i 's list. Then, a doubly-linked list embedded in an array of students, supportList, stores the students for which p j gives their support. As before, adding to and removing from this list takes constant time. A counter stores the number of students assigned to p j in M .
Lecturer data structures. For each lecturer an array of (student, rank, boolean) tuples, prefList, stores their preference list in order of rank, with a True value stored in the ith boolean if student s i is assigned to a project of l k 's. Figure 5 shows an example with s 8 not assigned to l k at rank 1 and s 2 and s 3 both assigned at rank 2. Each lecturer also has an array of length n 1 , studentPositions which retains links to the position of (student, rank, boolean) tuples in l k 's prefList, and a counter stores the number of students assigned to l k in M . A doubly-linked list embedded in an array of projects, precariousProjList, stores the projects offered by l k that are precarious, where project p j is stored at index j − 1 in this list if it is precarious. Figure 5 shows p 2 being a precarious project of l k .
Similar to projects, by Proposition 10, once a lecturer is full and non-precarious they cannot accept a worse student than they already have for the remainder of the algorithm.
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A 3 2 -approximation algorithm for the Student-Project Allocation problem Assume l k is full and non-precarious. Using similar data structures described in the Project Data Structures section above we are able to find l k 's worst assigned student in constant time.
Student pointers. A student s i retains two pointers for the project(s) tied at the head of their list. One pointer first stores the first fully available project when iterating from left to right, and second stores the second fully available project. If first (respectively second) reaches the end of the tie, then a boolean firstFin (respectively secondFin) is set to True. For each iteration of the main while loop of Algorithm 1, each student s i first seeks a project at the head of their list that is fully available. This will be precisely the project p j that first points to. Then if second has not reached the end of the tie, (s i , p j ) is precarious and the project that second points to, p j , supports p j . If however, firstFin is set to True, then the leftmost project at the head of s i 's list is a favourite project, with (s i , p j ) being unable to become precarious. Proposition 19 shows that maximum number of applications a student can make to a project on their preference list is 3. At most twice in phase 1 (twice if removed as a precarious pair) and once in phase 2.
During phase 2 there are no fully available projects on s i 's list since s i must have applied and been rejected (in some way) from every project on their preference list at least once already. Therefore, the first and second pointers are not required in phase 2. During phase 1 the the first and second pointers are only required to iterate once over each tie as described above. Hence, the maximum number of times a student's list is iterated over is 4; once each for the two pointers first and second, once again after first and second have reached the end of the tie at the head of a student's list (the student may have retained projects at the head of their list after this point if the projects were precarious), and finally once during phase 2.
Matching data structures. The current matching is stored in an array of cells matchArray where cell i − 1 contains project p j if (s i , p j ) ∈ M or null otherwise. Figure 5 shows and example with student s 2 being assigned to project p 6 .
Processes (in the order encountered in Algorithm 1): 1. a student s i applies to a favourite project: if s i 's FirstFin is set to True then there are no fully available projects at the head of s i 's list, and a favourite project of s i will be the leftmost project. If however, FirstFin is False then there are fully available projects at the head of their list and a favourite project of s i is pointed to by first, which is retrievable in constant time.
deciding if a project p j is undersubscribed or full or deciding if a lecturer l k is undersub-
scribed or full: Using the counters described above a comparison can be made between p j 's capacity and their current number of allocations. A similar comparison can be made for l k . Both can be achieved in constant time. 3. deciding if project p j is fully available: p j would not be fully available if either p j is full or l k is full. Therefore a comparison of the number of allocations for p j and l k and their respective capacities is required. Again this can be achieved in constant time. 4. adding a pair (s i , p j ) to M : Project p j is placed in the i − 1'th cell of matchArray and p j and l k 's allocation counters are incremented. Project p j 's projectedPrefList and lecturer l k 's prefList booleans are updated in constant time using their associated studentPositions data structures. Each tuple in these lists has a link to the head of phase 1 and phase 2 lists for their tie. When the pair is added the tuple is added to either the phase 1 or phase 2 list. If (s i , p j ) is precarious then s i is added to p j 's precariousList and the project pointed to by second, p j adds s i to their supportList. If p j has just changed from being non-precarious to precarious then l k adds p j to their precariousProjList. If the addition of (s i , p j ) to M means that p j goes from being fully available to not being fully available then we need to ensure that other students who rely on p j as their support are updated. Therefore p j alerts each student on their supportList that they are no longer to be relied upon as a fully available project. This triggers each of those students to update their second pointers. The time required for this can be attributed to the movement of second pointers as noted earlier. After being alerted, some other pair in M may stop being precarious, but any changes can be conducted in constant time as described above. If on adding pair (s i , p j ), p j has now become full and non-precarious then the last pointer will move from right to left over projectedPrefList until it reaches the end of a tie whose phase 1 and phase 2 lists are non-empty. From this point on last is only updated upon removing a pair from M (Point 8).
deciding if l k is precarious, and returning a precarious project if one exists:
Checking whether precariousProjList is empty for l k is a simple process that takes constant time. Retrieving a precarious pair should one exist requires selection of the first student from l k 's precariousProjList.
Finding a worst assignee of l k and deciding if l k meta-prefers s i to this worst assignee:
This operation only needs to be executed if l k is full and non-precarious. In that situation l k 's last pointer will point to the rightmost position in a tie in prefList such that l k 's current worst student s w is assigned at the same rank. Then as previously discussed, all that is required is to check the links to phase 1 and phase 2 students for this tie and return a phase 1 student if one exists, or phase 2 student if not. This can be conducted in constant time. Deciding if l k meta-prefers s i to s w can also be done in constant time by comparing rank and phase.
removing a preference list entry from s i 's list: This process is shown in Algorithm 2
which runs in constant time, since we can find a specific project p j in s i 's prefList using the projPosition array. 8. removing a pair (s i , p j ) from M : The i − 1'th cell of matchArray is set to null, and p j and l k 's allocation counters are decremented. Project p j 's projectedPrefList and lecturer l k 's prefList booleans are updated in constant time. The tuples associated with s i in these lists are removed from their phase 1 or phase 2 list in constant time. If a pair (s i , p j ) is removed from M , then this is either because p j or l k is full. By Proposition 8, p j cannot subsequently become fully available. Thus, the removal of a pair cannot change p j 's fully available status. All that is required then is to check whether (s i , p j ) was precarious, and update p j 's precariousList and l k 's precariousProjList. If on removing pair (s i , p j ), the last pointer now points to a tie with empty phase 1 and phase 2 lists, last needs to be updated and accordingly moves from right to left until it reaches the end of a tie with a non-empty phase 1 or phase 2 list. 9. deciding if p j is precarious, and returning a precarious pair if one exists: Similar to Point 5 above but using the precariousList of p j . 10. Finding a worst assignee of p j according to l k and deciding if l k meta-prefers s i to this worst assignee: Similar to Point 6 above, this operation is only required if p j is full and not precarious, at which point p j 's last pointer will point to the rightmost position in a tie in projectedPrefList such that l k 's current worst student assigned to p j , s w is assigned at the same rank. As above retrieving s w and comparing its rank and phase with s i takes constant time.
Therefore, all operations inside the main while loop of Algorithm 1 run in constant time. 
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if s i prefers p k to p j then p j is undersubscribed, s i is assigned and prefers
let ρ k be the list of student and rank tuples associated with project M (s i ) and let boolean β k indicate whether M (s i ) is on stack S 10: Proof. Abraham et al. [1] describes the process of a sequence of promotions for houses in the ha problem in order to return a trade-in-free matching. A similar process is described here to remove all blocking pairs of type (3bi). We create the following data structures.
A linked list ρ j of students s i for each project p j such that s i is assigned in M , finds p j acceptable. We may also start by assuming that ρ j involves only students who prefer p j to M (s i ), however the time complexity is unaffected by this. A ranking list r i for each student s i built as an array such that r i = j contains the rank of p j for student s i ; A stack S of undersubscribed projects p j , such that ρ j is non-empty, is created; A variable β j for each project p j which records whether p j is already in S.
These data structures can be initialised in O(m) time where m is the total length of all student preference lists.
Execution of Algorithm 5 proceeds as follows. For each iteration of the while loop a project p j is taken from stack S. Project p j must be undersubscribed and have non-empty list ρ j . The first tuple from ρ j , (s i , r) is removed and if s i would prefer to be assigned to p j than M (s i ) (found by comparing r and α i ) then we remove pair (s i , M (s i )) from M and add 
B.4 Performance guarantee B.4.1 Preliminary definitions
The underlying graph G of an spa-st instance I consists of sets of student, project and lecturer vertices. Edges exist between a student vertex s i and a project vertex p j if s i finds p j acceptable. Edges exist between a project vertex p j and lecturer vertex l k if l k offers p j .
The mapped graph G of the underlying graph G of the spa-st instance I is created in the following way. Let all student vertices remain unchanged. For each lecturer vertex l k we create multiple cloned vertices l
Let M be the matching found by Algorithm 1 for instance I and let M opt be a maximum stable matching in I. In G there are edges between students and projects, and projects and lecturers, whereas G contains only edges between students and lecturer clones.
An ( if (s i , p j ) is in M 0 for some student s i then 10: 
B.4.2 Example
This example demonstrates the creation of graph G from graph G and matchings M and M opt . Figure 6 shows example instance I of spa-st.
, (s 4 , p 3 )} be stable matchings in I. Clearly, M opt is also a maximum stable matching as all students are assigned. Figure 7a shows the underlying graph G of instance I. To create the vertices of G , student vertices are copied, and multiple lecturer cloned vertices are created. For lecturer vertices l 1 and l 2 in G with capacities of 2, we create l Figure 7b shows a part built G with all M opt edges added.
Next M is calculated using Algorithm 6. A copy of M \M opt is created and denoted
} is a copy of the set of all lecturer cloned vertices, and L 0 is the empty set. We iterate through L 0 as follows. As M 0 is now empty, we do not enter the final while loop on Line 19 of Algorithm 6 therefore M is now complete. Figure 7c shows the completed mapped graph G with edge set M ∪ M opt .
B.4.3 Components in G
An alternating path in G is defined as a path that comprises edges in M opt and in M alternately. A path or alternating path is described as even if there are an even number of edges in the path, odd otherwise. Finally, an alternating cycle is a sequence of edges in M opt and M alternately, which forms a cycle.
A component c in G is defined as any maximal connected subgraph in G . Figure 8 shows the possible component structures that may be found in G which are described in more detail below. Let n c,l and n c,s denote the maximum number of lecturer clones and students respectively, in some component c of G , and let n c = max{n c,l , n c,s }. Assume then that p j is precarious at T 0 . Then there must exist a precarious pair (s i , p j ) in the matching for some student s i . We know from Proposition 10 that when a project is not fully available and non-precarious, it cannot again become precarious. Therefore, when s i applied in phase 1 to p j , it was either fully available or precarious (or both), and so (s i , p j ) must have been added to the matching. But at some point before T 0 , since s i is applying in phase 2, (s i , p j ) was removed from the matching. This can only happen when p j is not fully available and either (s i , p j ) is precarious or is a worst student in M (p j ) (also a worst assignee of M (l k )). Proof. We know that a student worse than or equal to l k 's worst ranked assignees in M (p j ) cannot become assigned to p j before T 0 by Proposition 13. It remains to strengthen this statement to be true for the rest of the algorithm.
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After T 0 , if there is a blocking pair associated with a student assigned to p j then by Propositions 15 and 16 we know that at T 0 , M (p j ) must contain one of the worst students in M (l k ). Therefore, the only way a worse ranked student could become assigned to p j after T 0 is if p j is undersubscribed at T 0 .
But this would mean that there was some point T 1 before T 0 and after p j was full and non-precarious, that p j became undersubscribed by the removal of (s i , p j ) for some student s i . Denote this point as T 2 . The removal of (s i , p j ) occurring at T 2 can only have happened if l k was full, non-precarious (since we are removing a non-precarious pair) and l k preferred some other student s i to s i . But by Proposition 13 l k cannot assign to a worse student after this point. Therefore l k cannot subsequently assign to a worse student than s i (the worst student in M (p j ) when p j was full). and s c,2 are assigned to the same or different projects in M and M opt , respecting the fact that projects may only be offered by one lecturer. Let s c,1 = s i and s c,2 = s i . Figure 9 shows the possible configurations in G relating to c in G . They are found by noting that all configurations in G must have: 2 students; 1 or 2 lecturers; between 2 and 3 projects; student s i must be unassigned in M ; and s i must be assigned a project of the same lecturer in M opt as s i is in M . Note that it is not possible for there to be only one project p j in the configuration since s i would be assigned to p j in both M and M opt , meaning (s i , p j ) would not exist in M opt \M or M \M opt and so neither of the edges from s c,1 would exist in G , a contradiction.
We now show that none of the subgraphs shown in Figure 9 can occur in a matching M with respect to G found using Algorithm 1. Assume for contradiction that one does occur. We consider each type of subgraph separately.
(a) Students s i and s i are assigned to p j and p j in M opt respectively, and s i is assigned to p j in M . Lecturer l k offers both p j and p j . If p j is undersubscribed at time T 0 , then l k cannot be precarious (as s i was rejected) and so l k does not meta-prefer s i to its worst assignee s w ∈ M (l k ).
Lecturer l k must be full at this point since p j is not fully available and is undersubscribed. As l k is full and must remain non-precarious by Proposition 10, after T 0 , it is only possible for l k to improve their allocations, by Proposition 13. Since l k meta-prefers s i to s i (s i is in phase 2), when s i applies to p j , s i must also be rejected. Project p j is not precarious and so s i must remove p j from their list, contradicting the fact that s i must be assigned to p j in phase 1. If p j is full at T 0 then we know l k does not meta-prefer s i to its worst assignee s w in M (p j ). By Proposition 13, p j cannot accept worse assignments than are currently in M (p j ) until after the main while loop, therefore when s i applies to p j before the main while loop as in the previous case they must also be rejected, a contradiction as above.
Assume therefore that s i is successful in their application at T 0 . Pair (s i , p j ) must be removed at some point after T 0 since (s i , p j ) / ∈ M . Denote the time (s i , p j ) is removed as T 1 . The removal at T 1 must have occurred before the end of the main while loop since otherwise s i would be assigned to some project in the finalised matching M , a contradiction (the same students are assigned when removing blocking pairs of type (3bi)). We know that (s i , p j ) was added either after T 0 and before T 1 or after T 1 . Once added (s i , p j ) cannot be removed from above.
Assume (s i , p j ) was added before T 1 . At T 1 (before the end of the main while loop) pair (s i , p j ) is removed. This must either be because p j is undersubscribed and l k is full, or because p j is full. * If the former then l k is full and cannot be precarious since we are removing a non-precarious pair (p j is non-precarious after T 0 ). But this removal can only happen if s i is the worst student assigned to l k at T 1 . But by the definition of a worst assignee s i (being in phase 1) would be removed before s i . Therefore, (s i , p j ) must have already been removed from the matching, a contradiction to the fact that (s i , p j ) cannot be removed. * Using similar reasoning, if p j is full at T 1 , then (as we are removing a non-precarious pair), s i must be the worst student assigned in M (p j ). was not meta-preferred by l k to any student in M (p j ), by above. But similar to Case c we can say that by Proposition 23, p j is undersubscribed in the finalised matching M . Therefore, at least one non-precarious pair involved with p j must be removed (without a pair involving p j immediately replacing it) before the end of the algorithm. Denote this point in the algorithm's execution as T 1 and the removed pair (s i , p j ) for some student s i . Note T 1 may either be before of after the end of the main while loop. This type of removal can only happen when l k is full (this is clear before the main while loop, and is true after the main while loop by Proposition 7), and once a lecturer is full they remain full (since any pair deletion involving a project of l k can only occur with a pair addition involving a project of l k ). But (s i , p j ) was assigned when p j was fully available and so (s i , p j ) was assigned before T 1 . If T 1 occurs after the end of the main while loop then l k must be non-precarious at T 1 by Proposition 11. But this means precarious pair (s i , p j ) must have been removed before T 1 , a contradiction to the fact that (s i , p j ) can never be removed. Therefore the removal of (s i , p j ) at T 1 must have occurred before the end of the main while loop. But, since (s i , p j ) is precarious, it would be removed before non-precarious (s i , p j ), a contradiction. 2. If s i was accepted then pair (s i , p j ) would need to be removed before the algorithm terminated (since (s i , p j ) / ∈ M ). We know from before that p j is non-precarious at the point of application and further that pair (s i , p j ) must remain non-precarious by definition since s i applied in phase 2. Therefore, we need to remove non-precarious pair (s i , p j ) from the matching which can only happen if either p j is full or l k is full. Firstly assume that p j is full and pair (s i , p j ) is replaced with a meta-preferred student assigned to p j (p j must be non-precarious since we are removing a non-precarious pair). Since p j needs to be undersubscribed in the finalised matching M we are in the same position and
